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INTRODUCTION
THE EROBIEM
In all its aspects and relationships, agriculture is
subject to a considerable element of uncertainty. As a business
enterprise, that is, as a system of production, distribution and
exchange, it is susceptible to all the social and economic
uncertainties which any other similar enterprise is called upon
to face. As a mode of living, it has to reckon with all the
personal uncertainties arising from death or impairment of
health of farmers through sickness and accident and also from
the inability of agricultural managers and laborers to sell or
effectively employ their labor and management skills. On top of
all these, agriculture is especially susceptible to the physical
uncertainties of nature since it requires, as distinguished from
most other major forms of business enterprises, direct contact
with the force of nature.
Farmers have experienced severe droughts, hail storms,
and tornados that affect their farms. Adverse events like these
reduce farmers' crop yields and can have a significant impact on
their cash flow. Unfortunately, there are many natural hazards
including drought, excess moisture, flood, wind, frost, hail,
disease, insects, and fire which are largely outside their
(1)
control. All these uncertainties can make agriculture very risky
(Barnaby, p.l)
.
Table 1 depicts why wheat crops fail in Kansas, as
measured by the multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) claims
experience from 1981 to 1986.
There are strategies that farmers can take
to reduce the impact of these natural events. Risk-reducing
strategies include holding reserves of cash; preparing realistic
cash flow projections; and maintaining a good balance between
short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term debts; hedging,
forward contracting, and spreading of sales; improved manures;
diversification or growing more than one crop; rotation of
crops, ploughing, and accessory operations; share rental
arrangements; use of insect-resistent varieties; purchase of
crop insurance (Ray 1981, pp. 17-9); different varieties; and
geographical dispersion. Of the above strategies, crop
insurance is dealt with in this report.
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
The terms "risk" and "uncertainty", often used
interchangeably, have different technical connotations. Risk and
uncertainty can be distinguished on the basis of the state of
knowledge about probabilities. According to the above definition
if the probabilities are known, the decision problem is one of
(2)
Table 1. Causes of MPCI loss Payments
Causes Frequency
drought 35.4%
frost/freeze 21.1%
hail 17.1%
excess moisture 11.5%
wind 6 . 2%
others 3 . 6%
insects 2.8%
disease 2.3%
(Barnaby, P.l, his source was The American Association of Crop
Insurers, Washington, D.C.
)
(3)
risk. In contrast, if the probabilities are unknown, the problem
is one of uncertainty. In other words, while uncertainty is
subjective probability, risk is objective probability. The
former represents a probable state of mind, the latter a state
of things (Knight, p. 233). Defined in terms of knowledge, if
there is sufficient knowledge to specify a unique outcome, it is
certainty. If there is insufficient knowledge, it is
uncertainty. Thus an uncertain event is an event with more than
one possible outcome (Robinson, p. 12-13).
There is difference between Business risk and Financial
risk. Business risk is defined to be the risk inherent in the
firm, independent of the way it is financed (Van Home,
pp. 207-8 ) . Business risk generally is reflected in the
variability of net operating income or net cash flows. A high
(low) coefficient of variation of net cash flows would indicate
high (low) business risk. Business risk may be evaluated at a
point in time based on the probability distribution of net cash
flows. Financial risk is defined to be the added variability of
the net cash flows of the owners of equity that results from the
fixed financial obligation associated with debt financing and
cash leasing (Barges, p. 16).
(4)
The following paragraphs about the natural and social risk
are based on Ray 1981, pp. 6-11.
Risks to agricultural property may be divided into
three major groups: (a) natural risk, (b) social risk, and (c)
economic risk, depending on whether the uncertainty involved is
due to natural or social or economic factors. However, since
crop insurance covers natural hazards, natural risk and risk of
fire (a social risk) are discussed here.
Natural Risks
Natural risks mean natural hazards that reduce the yield
and bring crop failure.
Natural hazards are composed of two kinds: (1) adverse
weather such as hail, windstorm, frost, drought, excessive
moisture, flood, and tornado, and (2) pests such as insects,
plant diseases, and weeds.
As a result of these natural hazards, the crop yield may be
reduced. So the annual returns and incomes of a crop farmer can
vary widely from year to year. Change in farm production is
caused not only by adverse weather but also by diseases as
well as by insects and other pests. Diseases affect diverse
products like wheat, potatoes, tomatoes, and cotton.
In the U.S.
,
the losses caused by the uncertainties of weather
(5)
are great because there is a high level of technology to
control diseases, insects, and other pests.
Social Risks
While agriculture is subject to various natural
hazards, it is also liable to be affected by social risks.
Although social risks include many factors, fire and theft
are discussed here. The two factors are not always anticipated
by farmers. Fires may happen by natural causes such as
lightening. But fires are often caused by human beings. Theft
moves farm property. In fact, the risk of theft of such farm
property is great because farms are scattered over regions where
it is impossible for a farmer to watch all his assets. Also,
there are risks of changes in government policies such as
government farm programs and tax policies. Loss of rented land
is another major source of risk.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This study focuses on crop insurance in the U.S.
The objective is to review literature and theoretical models
related to crop insurance. As a risk response, crop insurance
responds directly to short-falls in crop yields. Crop insurance
can play a role in reducing lending risks and contributing to
the economic performance of both the borrower and the lender.
(6)
Crop insurance also has important policy implications because it
is one of several policy instruments used by the federal
government to became the primary form of disaster protection for
farmers.
LITERATURE REVIEW
CONCEPT OF CROP INSURANCE
In this section an explanation of insurance in general is
followed by a discussion focused on crop insurance. Insurance is
a social device which aims at eliminating the uncertain risk
of loss for the individual through combination of many
individual risks and the distribution of a loss among the many
insurers. In other words, insurance provides protection against
economic losses arising from adverse events. For example, life
insurance protects surviving dependents against the loss of
income that occurs when a family member dies.
In general, while the occurrence of an individual loss can
not be predicted, considered with a large number of similar
losses its occurrence can be predicted. Therefore insurance
implies the combining of small unpredictable risks so that
annual losses for the combined group became predictable. It is
possible for a person to avoid the burden of a loss by paying a
(7)
proportionate share of the losses for the group as a whole.
Insurance distributes the burden of loss not only over space but
also over time. It accumulates premiums that the insurers pay in
the normal periods. So it uses accumulated funds to relieve
any unusual loss burden occurring at an unfavorable period.
Thus insurance evens out the loss burden over individuals and
time (Ray 1974, pp. 6-7).
Ihis study is focused on crop insurance.
Crop insurance can be classified into different types according
to different criteria. According to the hazards it may be
classified into a specific-risk and an all-risk insurance.
According to the object insured, it may be classified into
either single-crop insurance or multiple-crop insurance.
Classified on the basis of administration, it may be public or
private insurance. Finally, according to the basis of its scope
and application, it may be classified into voluntary insurance
and compulsory insurance.
Generally, crop insurance is available in two forms:
(1) limited peril insurance, including commercial hail and
fire insurance; and
(2) multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI)
Hail and fire crop insurance (H/FCI) undertakes to
indemnify the farmer against loss of crops caused by damage
(8)
through hail and fire. It does not cover damage by other natural
elements such as drought, excessive moisture, insects, disease
and frost unless specially mentioned.
Hail and fire crop insurance is offered under two types of
plans: spot and area. Spot plans indemnify insured-farmers
against damage based on the percentage loss occurring because of
hail and fire on specified acres. In contrast, area plans
compensate insured-farmers for loss based on the percentage of
yield loss due to hail and fire averaged across the insured
unit.
While H/FCI covers the damage caused by hail and fire, MPCI
protect the farmers against uncertainties of crop yields
arising out of all natural factors beyond their control. MPCI
covers loss in guantity as well as guality. It ensures a minimum
average yield per acre for the insured crop. Protection is
limited to a specified percentage (say 50-75%) of the average
yield. If average yield for the insured unit falls below the
specified level, the insured farmer can be paid the difference
between average yield and the specified level (Barnaby, p.l)
.
(9)
THE HISTORY OF CROP INSURANCE
Most of this section is based on information found in
"Agricultural Insurance" written by Ray 1981, pp. 162-8.
Early Experience
The first crop insurance policies in the U.S. were written
for tobacco farmers in colonial times. But in those early days,
many of the small private companies writing policies had
inadequate cash reserves and highly concentrated business. So
when heavy losses occurred, claims had to be prorated. This
caused dissatisfaction among policyholders, and often resulted
in liquidation of the companies.
Since several efforts by private companies to provide crop
insurance had been for the most part unsuccessful, in the early
1920s, officials in the U.S. Department of Agriculture became
interested in crop insurance and carried on some research. Also
the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling for investigation of
crop insurance. The resolution provided for the appointment of
a select Senate committee to investigate crop insurance.
However, at that time, it was thought preferable for
the Government to assist private insurance companies rather than
to go into the insurance business.
(10)
Federal Crop Insurance
Great interest in multiple-peril crop insurance took place
in the mid-193Os because of the extended drought in the Great
Plains. In 1936, President Roosevelt appointed a committee to
make recommendations for legislation providing for
Government-sponsored crop insurance. The administration passed
the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938 (Title V of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938)
.
To implement the Crop Insurance Program, the legislation
established the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC)
.
Insurance was authorized only for wheat. Farmers could insure
between 50 and 75 percent of their recorded average yields
against losses because of natural hazards.
The Federal Crop Insurance Program had originally three
objectives:
(1) protection of farmers 1 income against crop failure and
a decline of crop price.
(2) protection of consumers 1 against lack of food
and a rise of crop price.
(3) support to business and employment by providing
continuous food supplies and establishing farm
purchasing power.
(11)
The Initial Experience with Federal Crop Insurance
The original Act provided only for insurance on wheat in
the first year, 1939. Insurance on cotton began in 1942. Both
were very large programs in which the insurance was offered
nationwide. The initial experience of crop insurance was less
than encouraging. During the first year, 1939, nearly one-third
of the insured farmers collected indemnities. Indemnities
exceeded premiums. Also losses exceeded premiums on both wheat
and cotton in each of the first 5 years, 1939-43. Although
heavy losses resulted directly from droughts, there were also
some defects in the insurance plan and administrative
operations. Because of the disappointing experience of the
early years, Congress passed legislation withdrawing the
insurance in the 1944 crop year.
The crop insurance program was revived by Congress in 1945
with insurance on wheat and cotton to be made generally
available. Also experimental work on corn and tobacco was to be
started. Experience improved with wheat, and was satisfactory
with corn and tobacco. However, large program losses occurred
on cotton in both 1945 and 1946 because of widespread drought.
In 1946, total indemnities for all crops exceeded premiums by
about $30 million. By the end of that year, more than 75
percent of FCIC's original capital stock had been used to pay
losses not covered by premiums.
(12)
As a result of the heavy losses, legislation was passed
to limit the operations of the corporation.
Limited Program
In 1947, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation collected
premiums in excess of indemnities on combined operations. But
legislation passed that year curtailed the operations of the
corporation. The 1947 amendments reduced federal crop insurance
to an experimental program. As a result of the legislation, the
corporation reduced its operation from 2,500 to 375 counties in
1947. Although the scope of the program was reduced, the
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation was given greater latitude in
experimenting with alternative forms of insurance. Two new
experimental programs were tried in 1948. One was a program for
dry edible beans instituted in four widely separated counties
with different types of farming. The other was a multiple-crop
contract, with indemnities determined on the basis of combined
coverage.
Curing the 1950s, the crop insurance program began to
stabilize. Although some new crops were added and minor
experimentation continued, most changes involved fine tuning the
program. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation announced that
beginning in 1956, insurance would no longer be sold in
(13)
fourteen counties in Colorado, New mexico, and Texas. These
were considered high-risk farming areas not suitable for
insurance, because total indemnities had substantially exceeded
total premiums.
Beginning in 1957, there was a five-year period in which
premiums exceeded indemnities every year. The loss ratio in
1958 of 0.26 was the lowest in nineteen years of operation.
This was well below what was ever expected in the program.
EUring the 1960s, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
concentrated on increasing its coverage, which reached $920
million in 1969.
Early in 1969, the secretary of agriculture appointed a new
board. The new management undertook a review of the program to
identify reasons for the poor financial position of the
corporation. The corporation concluded that in many counties
insurance structures had been weakened by the use of shorter
time periods for determining coverages. The result was that
coverages were based on recent trends rather than long-term
averages.
The corporation's review revealed that in many cases
premium rates had been reduced below what experience could
justify. For some new crops, risks had been miscalculated and
premiums set too low.
(14)
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation instituted several
changes in the operation of its 1970 program. In most cotton
counties, premiums were increased and coverage was decreased.
The experimental potato program was discontinued.
In 1970, the General Accounting Office concurred with the
need for individualized protection. The General Accounting
Office concluded that low participation prevented Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation from operating an effective disaster
protection program. To increase farmers' participation in the
federal crop insurance program, individualized protection was
proposed.
Disaster Payments Program
The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, and
the Rice Production Act of 1975 established a disaster payments
program. Farmers participating in price and income support
programs were eligible for payments. Payments for prevented
planting were made to producers who were unable to plant or who
underplanted because of natural hazards.
The disaster payments program was popular with farmers,
because it provided disaster protection with no premium costs
and coverage in high-risk areas.
(15)
The legislators decided to establish a more comprehensive
program for the protection of the farmers against natural
hazards. As the administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service (ASCS) , USDA, observed in 1977: "The
proposed farm Production Protection Act will expand multiple-
risk protection to all counties and cover almost all crops as
well as other production investment on farms. This new bill will
establish a program that combines the insurance provisions of
the PCIC Act and the USDA disaster and indemnity payment
programs to protect producers against losses. Most important,
it will be a more responsive program to deal with the economic
problems that farmers may face" (PCIC,USDA, p. 3). Although the
title of the proposed legislation was later changed to "Federal
Crop Insurance Act of 1979," its basic purpose remains the
same.
The Crop Insurance Act Amendments of 1980
The Crop Insurance Act Amendments of 1980 (CIAA) were far
reaching. They provided a vehicle for all agricultural producers
to be protected by private companies backed by the federal
government, and corrected many of the inadeguacies of previous
crop insurance programs. The result is affordable protection for
most farmers throughout the U.S. In addition, this 1980 Act
expanded the crop insurance program to become the major form of
(16)
disaster protection in the U.S. The Act authorized the
expansion of the program to all counties with significant
agriculture. If sufficient actuarial data were available, the
FCIC was permitted to insure any agricultural commodity grown in
the U.S. The initial expansion of the program was targeted for
those counties with substantial acreages of crops formerly
covered by the disaster payments program. In order to provide a
transition period, the Act extended the disaster payments
program through 1981.
The Act also permitted specific risk protection programs
for prevented planting, wildlife depredation, tree damage and
disease, and insect infestation, provided such protection was
not available from private companies. It authorized research and
pilot programs on rangeland, livestock poisoning and disease,
and destruction of bees due to pesticide use.
To summarize, the U.S. government became involved in crop
insurance only after several attempts in the private sector to
provide multiple-peril crop insurance failed. These private
efforts failed for a number of reasons: (1) coverage of price as
well as yield risk, (2) inadequate geographical dispersion of
risks, and (3) insufficient data for a sound actuarial program.
The public program begun in 1938 encountered some of these same
difficulties, particularly inadequate data. High loss ratios
(17)
resulted, and the program was subsequently reduced to an
experimental basis in 1948. During the next several decades,
the program gradually expanded and operated on a limited but
successful basis.
Because of the high cost of the disaster payment programs
during the 1970s, the crop insurance program was expanded by
1980 legislation to become the nation's primary means of
disaster protection for farmers. Subsidies were greatly
increased, and the private insurance industry was encouraged to
assume much of the marketing role for PCIC.
REASONS FOR CROP INSURANCE
Much of this section is based on information found in Ray
1981, pp. 109-111. This section is divided into two parts, need
and benefits.
Need for Crop Insurance
The business of farming involves numerous risks, natural
and social. But the principal characteristic which distinguishes
farming from most other businesses is its great dependence
on nature. Farming has to be carried on in the face of
uncertainties rising out of diverse natural elements such as
(18)
wind, flood, drought, frost, hail, insects, other pests and
various crop diseases. Normally the greatest impact of all
these factors falls on crop production.
Some of the present uncertainty of crop production could be
removed by such measures as irrigation and improvements in
social and institutional organization. Still a good deal of
uncertainty will always be there. For one thing, no imaginable
measures could make crop cultivation completely independent of
the natural hazards. Secondly, most of the physical measures
are to be justified by their cost-benefit ratio. There may be
many places, for example, where flood is preventable, but the
cost of preventive measures would be greater than their benefit.
In such cases it would not be economical to spend more capital
in preventing a risk than would be lost by the risk itself. It
may be in the interest of the individual owners that such lands
should remain in production even if there were occasional risks
of failure.
So the risks of crop production have to be faced. A serious
crop failure means not only the loss of farmers' incomes but
also the loss of their investments in crops. The resulting
low incomes of farmers may lead to the failure to pay rents and
taxes, to their loss of purchasing power, and to mounting debt.
(19)
Thereby, the entire cxaranunity is affected by risks of which the
farmers are the direct and primary victims
Various methods have been adopted for helping the
farmers to compensate for losses of their crops through natural
hazards. Reduction of land rent and taxes, cancellation of
accumulated agricultural debts and direct relief from the
government are among the principal methods applied. There are
two major reasons why such policies are undesirable. First,
farmers cannot expect them as a right, but only as a privilege,
the extent of which is largely dependent on the policies and
resources of the government. Even when concessions and relief
are provided by law, their permanence may not be feasible nor
strictly desirable. For large expenditures on relief can only
be provided through budgetary appropriations representing an
additional burden on Government. Second, the continued prospects
of relief may make recipients depend on the government and are
also likely to be questioned by the non-farming community. An
important measure that is largely free from the above
difficulties is insurance of growing crops against all natural
and unavoidable hazards. But crop insurance is dependent on the
government to the extent it is subsidized by the government.
The need and justification for crop insurance have been
(20)
stated in an annual report of the Manager of the United States
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation:
"Large sums of money are spent each year in agricultural
research to develop better varieties of seed, more effective
means of controlling insects and diseases and improved
methods of farming. Soil conservation practices have been
encouraged by making available technical assistance as well
as cash payments to the farmer. Price supports have been
provided for more than a decade to help maintain some degree
of stability in farm income. Despite all these measures the
farmer will receive but little income in any year if he
invests his time, money and effort to produce a crop only to
be faced with a crop failure due to some cause over which he
has no control. Insurance protection spans this crop failure
gap. It is an essential part of a well-rounded agricultural
program designed to provide security for farmers" (USDA 1947,
p. 20)
.
Benefits of Crop Insurance
The benefits to be derived frcm crop insurance will vary
according to the nature and extent of protection provided by it.
(21)
Crop insurance cushions the shock of disastrous crop loss
by assuring farmers a minimum of protection against natural
hazards. Crop insurance spreads the crop losses over space and
time. losses suffered by farmers in particular localities are
borne by many scattered over wide areas. Reserves accumulated
in good years, in large part out of the premiums paid by the
farmers themselves, are used to meet losses in bad years.
Crop insurance can facilitate increased agricultural
production by making farmers willing to adopt new and more
productive (but uncertain) technology.
With crop insurance, a certain income is guaranteed to the
farmer even if the crop fails. The farmer can afford the risks
that may be associated with same of the more intensive
cultivation methods. He can also make his farming more
extensive. With insurance proceeds to retire the outstanding
loan, he will be a more creditworthy risk and thus able to
qualify for a loan to obtain the resources he needs to resume
cultivation in the next growing season. Crop insurance thus
provides greater stability to farm output over time.
In addition to benefiting farmers, crop insurance can be of
direct benefit to the government. Crop insurance can facilitate
implementation of a consistent national agricultural policy.
(22)
With proper planning, crop insurance can contribute to the
development of more stable farm prices by encouraging farmers to
produce continually. The added agricultural production promoted
by the crop insurance program can improve the country's balance
of payments position by increasing its exports or reducing its
imports.
Crop insurance can also be of significant benefit to
financial institutions. A difficulty facing government-
sponsored agricultural lending institutions is the severe
decapitalization they experience when crop losses render a large
volume of their agricultural loans uncollectible. However, crop
insurance can be used as a form of collateral, thereby improving
the creditworthiness of the farmers.
Thus, crop insurance can be used as an important instrument
of social and economic policy to be pursued by the government
especially for the protection of the farming community and for
ensuring stability in farm and general income.
(23)
CONCEPIUAL ANALYSIS
THE THEORY OF CROP INSURANCE
This section is based on information found in Hazell,
Pcmareda, and Valdes, pp. 35-42.
This discussion of the theory of Crop Insurance will be
limited to the farmer level. Farmers allocate their resources to
obtain desired combinations of expected income and income risks.
Higher expected incomes typically require more risk. So most
farmers trade some expected income for reduced fluctuation of
income.
The intended purposes of Crop Insurance are to stabilize
income and ensure enough income each year to repay debts and
meet essential living costs. If these objectives can be met,
farmers will be encouraged to seek higher expected profits.
In the case of single-crop farms, insurance can reduce
income risks if it reduces the variance of returns from that
activity and increases the level of income realized in bad
years. Assume that production costs are not risky and the
objective is to reduce the variability of income as measured by
its variance. Then the variance of income can be expressed as
(24)
the following equation (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker 1977,
P-33),
2 2
V(R) = E(P) V(Q) + E(Q) V(P) + 2E(P)E(Q)Cov(P,Q) (1)
where R
P
Q
V(R)
V(Q)
V(P)
E(P)
E(Q)
Cov(P,Q)
revenue
the price of the crop
the yield of the crop
variance of returns
variance of yield
variance of price
expected price
expected yield
covariance between price and yield
Currently crop insurance insures a specified yield level
and does not insure price. In the above equation, if variance of
price, V(P) , is the major factor of risk facing farmers (suppose
that yields do not vary much) , compensating for reductions in
yield may not have much effect on V(R) . The second term on
the right side of equation 1 would then tend to dominate V(R)
.
Since crop insurance does not cover price, crop insurance would
2
only act on the remaining two terms, E(P) V(Q) and
2E(P)E(Q)Cov(P,Q), in the equation. Under these situations,
stabilization of price will be more effective. Yield
(25)
compensation will be less effective in reducing V(R) when prices
and yields are negatively correlated. High prices will tend to
offset low yields and vice versa, and the covariance term will
be negative. Then, V(R) may not fluctuate much and can be
stabilized. Poor yields may not even coincide with the worst
revenue outcomes if the negative correlation is strong enough.
For the case of multicrop farms, it is also necessary to
pay attention to the covariance between the returns of different
th
crops. A j subscript represents the j crop, then the variance
of total farm revenue is
V(R) = V(ZR ) = Z V(R ) + Z ZCov(R ,R ). (2)
jj Jj i£)j ij
th
Even though crop insurance for the j crop were
successful in reducing V(R ) , it still may not stabilize farm
j
income. This depends on how the crop insurance affects the
th
covariances between the returns of the j crop with the
returns of all other crops. A desirable insurance scheme should
reduce the positive covariances and increase the absolute
value of the negative ones in order to reduce V(R ) . However it
j
is possible for insurance to reduce V(R ) yet increase the size
j
of positive covariances to the point where V(R) increases.
(26)
The most established decision theory in economics is the
expected utility theory. The expected income-variance criterion
assumes that a farmer's preferences among alternative farm plans
are based on expected income E(y) and associated income variance
V(y) . Expected utility theory offers a useful way of formalizing
a farmer's distaste for fluctuations in income. This theory
assumes that each individual has a utility function for money.
The shape of this function determines the income distribution
parameters that the individual considers when choosing among
strategies with risky outcomes. In this case it is assumed that
farmers behave according to a closely related decision
criterion: the mean-income standard-deviation criterion. It is
also assumed that farmers maximize an expected utility function
of the form,
E(u) = E(y) - @V(y) (3)
where E(u) : expected utility
E(y) : expected income
§ : a risk-aversion parameter
V(y) : standard deviation of income
This criterion means that the farmers try to choose the
farm plan for which the associated standard deviation of income
is minimum for a given level of expected income. They will be
willing to sacrifice expected income in order to reduce V(y) to
the point where the marginal trade-off is exactly @. If the
(27)
farmer is risk averse, then § is positive and the iso-utility
curves are linear and upward sloping in E(y) , V(y) space (Figure
1).
Figure 1 represents a set of indifference curves
corresponding to equation 3. For any farm planning problem
there is also an efficient mean-income standard-deviation set
of farm plans. For each of these plans, V(y) is as small as
possible for the corresponding level of E(y) . In figure 1,
the efficient frontier, OQ, is the locus of all efficient mean-
income standard-deviation plans; all other feasible plans lie to
the right of this frontier and are not efficient. Once the
efficient E(y) , V(y) frontier is known, then knowledge of the
risk aversion parameter, @, leads to identification of the
optimal. The optimal plan for farmers is the one that maximizes
their utility. This plan will always be a member of the
efficient set. In figure 1, it is the plan defined by point P,
the point where the utility surface is tangent to the efficient
frontier.
The chosen decision criterion provides a direct
rationale for farmers to purchase crop insurance. Crop
insurance may reduce V(y) for various levels of E(y) in
Figure 1. This will bring the point of tangency with the
utility surface upward, allowing farmers to achieve hic^ier
(28)
Iso-Utility Lines
V(y)
Figure 1. The Optimal Mean-Income Standard-Deviation Farm Plan
(29)
levels of expected utility. For effective crop insurance
the reduction in V(y) obtained, multiplied by §, must compensate
more than for the insurance premium charged to E(y)
.
V(y) , as the measure of risk, is useful for formalizing the
second objective, namely the avoidance of disastrously low
incomes. This objective can be written as a probability
criterion of the form:
Pr(y > S) > 1 - oc, (4)
t -
th
where y : the t possible outcome for income net of all
t
production costs and any interest charges on borrowed
credit,
S : the minimum income required by farm families to meet
essential living costs, and
oe : a preassigned level of risk.
Since a positive income implies that all input costs financed
with credit are recovered, then the criterion requires that a
farm plan be chosen so that income is adequate to cover debt
repayment and family subsistence at least (1 - oc) proportion
of the time. If ocis set at 0.05, then equation 4 requires that
income exceed S at least 95 percent of the time.
(30)
When equation 4 is not satisfied, since farmers think more
highly of the survival of themselves and their families
than the repayment of debt, farmers default on loans. So
equation 4 can be interpreted as the probability of default,
with oc specifying the acceptable default rate. Farmers and
lenders may differ about what is an acceptable default risk.
The lenders' acceptable default rate may be constraining to
farmers. On this basis, there is no reason why o should bear
any relation to @, since they do not represent risk tolerances
for the same individual.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF WHY FARMERS MIGHT NOT PARTICIPATE.
The following three problems associated with crop insurance
have been mentioned in the literature; (1) Poor support of the
federal Government ( American Association of Crop Insurers)
,
(2) Overpayment of claims (USGAO) , and (3) Low participation
of farmers (Ray 1981)
.
For the purpose of this report, the problem of low
participation of farmers will be addressed. Specifically, "Why
would the farmers not participate?" Four reasons that farmers
might not participate are discussed below.
(31)
The first reason is based on equation 1, that is,
2 2
V(R)= E(P) V(Q)+ E(Q) V(P)+ 2E(P)E(Q)Cov(P,Q), in the theory of
crop insurance. As discussed earlier for the single crop model,
suppose variation of price has lots of impact on the variation
of returns; but yields do not vary much. Since, crop insurance
insure a specified yield level and does not insure price,
farmers will not benefit from purchasing crop insurance.
The second reason not to participate is based on
equation 2
,
V(R) = V(2R ) =IV(R ) +2 2 Cov(R ,R )
,
jj jj i^jj ij
in the theory of crop insurance. This equation represents the
case of multicrop farms. What is important is how the covariance
term impacts on V(R) , the total variance of all crops.
Generally, a good insurance scheme should reduce the positive
covariances and increase the absolute value of the negative
ones. However it is possible (but not very likely) for insurance
to reduce V(R ) yet increase the size of positive covariances to
J
the point where V(R) actually increases. If farmers produce
lots of crops, the impact of covariance terms on total variance
of returns may become great. Therefore, farmers may choose to
protect themselves from risk by diversification rather than
purchasing crop insurance.
(32)
The third reason is discovered in equation 3,
E(u) = E(y) - §V(y).
In this case, the risk parameter has a important role. If
farmers are risk-neutral ( @ = ) , then expected utility is
expected income. If farmers are risk-takers ( § < )
,
then expected utility increases as risk increases. So
these farmers do not take crop insurance. Even if farmers are
risk-averse, in cases where V(y) increases less than E(y)
increases and the size of @ is small, utility may increase as
standard deviation of income becomes larger.
The fourth reason is based on equation 3 and 4,
Pr(y > S) > 1 - oc .
t -
S(the nrinimum income for essential living cost) will be
concentrated on. Suppose the farmers have large amounts of
cash reserves and credit. Then S becomes very low. As S becomes
low, the risk parameter becomes low, and farmers are not
motivated to purchase crop insurance.
In summary, farmers will not be motivated to purchase crop
insurance if the following be true, (a) if the variation of
price is high and yields do not vary much, (b) if they are able
to reduce variation in total income by producing many kinds of
crops, (c) if they are risk-reutral or risk-takers, and/or
(d) if they have large amounts of cash reserves and credit.
(33)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this report is to review literature and
theoretical models related to crop insurance.
Drought, flood, freeze, hail, disease, and insects are some
of the hazards farmers face in growing crops. Crop losses,
especially in successive years, can be serious. They can result
in increased debt, reduced reserves, and curtailed spending. In
extreme situations, farmers may be forced to discontinue
operations. Lenders and businesses dealing with farmers and the
entire local rural economy may be adversely affected when farm
incomes drop.
Insurance with the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
provides a means by which some farmers can reduce the financial
impact of crop failures. Federal crop insurance is mainly
multiple-peril insurance which covers unavoidable losses from
natural hazards. Farmers take out insurance for stated levels of
crop production. Both quantity and quality may be specified. If
the production is less than the guarantee, indemnity is paid for
any shortage.
In the theory of crop insurance, the proposed models
indicate how crop insurance can affect income risks and
expected utility. In the case of single-crop farms, the reduced
(34)
variance of yields that happens due to crop insurance
decreases variance of income. In the multi-crop farms, crop
insurance could reduce the variation of individual crop returns
and covariances between the returns of one crop with the returns
of other crops. In the expected utility theory, crop insurance
can be used to reduce standard deviation of income. Whether
reduced standard deviation of income increases expected utility
depends on the risk-aversion parameter and impact on expected
returns. Crop insurance can support the minimum income
necessary to meet essential living cost.
There are, however, some problems in implementing any
scheme of crop insurance. In this report the problem of low
participation of farmers is analyzed by using theory to address
the guestion, "Why would the farmers not participate?" Farmers
will not be motivated to purchase crop insurance if the
following be true, (a) if the variation of price is high and
yields do not vary much, (b) if they can sufficiently reduce
variation in total income by producing many kinds of crops, (c)
if they are risk-neutral or risk-takers, and/or (d) if they have
large amount of cash reserves and credit.
(35)
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The purpose of this report is to review literature and
theorectical models related to crop insurance.
Drought, flood, freeze, hail, disease, and insects are some
of the hazards farmers face in growing crops. Crop losses,
especially in successive years, can be serious. They can result
in increased debt, reduced reserves, and curtailed spending. In
extreme situations, farmers may be forced to discontinue
operations. lenders and businesses dealing with farmers and the
entire local rural economy may be adversely affected when farm
incomes drop.
Insurance with the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
provides a means by which some farmers can reduce the financial
impact of crop failures. Federal crop insurance is mainly
multiple-peril insurance which covers unavoidable losses from
natural hazards. Farmers take out insurance for stated levels of
crop production. Both quantity and quality may be specified. If
the production is less than the guarantee, indemnity is paid for
any shortage.
In the theory of crop insurance, the proposed models
indicate how crop insurance can affect income risks and
expected utility. In the case of single-crop farms, the reduced
variance of yields that happens due to crop insurance
decreases variance of income. In the multi-crop farms, crop
insurance could reduce the variation of individual crop returns
and covariances between the returns of one crop with the returns
of other crops. In the expected utility theory, crop insurance
can be used to reduce standard deviation of income. Whether
reduced standard deviation of income increases expected utility
depends on the risk-aversion parameter and impact on expected
returns.
There are, however, some problems in implementing any
scheme of crop insurance. In this report the problem of low
participation of farmers is analyzed by using theory to address
the question, "Why would the farmers not participate?"
